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This paper draws on Cavoli and Rajan (2003) and Rajan (2002a, 2003b).. 4
 
ABSTRACT 
The infeasibility of a monetary union for East Asia in the near future, as well as the 
limitations of other forms of super fixes, appears to leave a flexible regime as the only 
viable policy option. This paper first deliberates on the case for and against a flexible 
regime. To anticipate the main conclusion - while favoring relatively more flexible 
regimes, emerging economies in East Asia and elsewhere have continued to heavily 
manage their currencies despite being officially described as ￿floaters￿. The paper goes 
on to explore the case for and operational mechanics behind an open inflation targeting 
regime which has increasingly been advocated for small and open economies in East 
Asia and elsewhere. The importance of incorporating the exchange rate in open economy 
monetary policy rules is stressed. The post-crisis East Asian monetary policy 
arrangements provide a suitable context for analyzing what part the exchange rate might 
play in the construction of an inflation targeting regime and there is evidence suggesting 
that East Asian monetary authorities have been attempting to manage the variability of 
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There seems to be a growing convergence of opinion that the need to 
depolicitise exchange rate movements, along with the frequency with which ￿soft 
pegs￿ have been susceptible to speculative attacks in this era of escalating global 
capital flows, has increased pressure for developing countries to adopt corner 
solutions to exchange rates arrangements. In other words, according to many 
observers, the exchange rate option for developing countries boils down to one 
between flexibility, on the one hand, and credible pegging, on the other. Countries 
are, however, advised to steer clear of arrangements that lie anywhere between these 
polar extremes (i.e. those in the ￿middle￿) as they are seen as inherently unstable 
(Figure 1).  
In line with these recommendations, the IMF data on exchange rate 
arrangements in developing countries reveals a de jure trend away from soft peg 
arrangements. For instance, the share of countries officially classified as having a 
pegged exchange rate regime dropped from 97 percent in 1970 to just 11 per cent by 
1999 (Table 1). This phenomenon has been colorfully described in various places as 
the ￿corners hypothesis￿, the ￿hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate regime￿, the 
￿missing middle￿, the ￿hollowing of the middle￿, and the ￿law of the excluded 
middle￿. 
A number of observers have strongly favored the corner - as opposed to an 
interior - solution of an irrevocably fixed regime. Such hard pegging or straitjacketing 
of the exchange rate is supposed to signal greater commitment to rule out arbitrary 
exchange rate adjustments (i.e. ￿escape clauses￿ cannot be invoked) and the 
willingness of the monetary authority to subordinate domestic policy objectives such 
as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the currency peg.   6
But how can an exchange rate peg be made credible? Only by making it 
almost unshiftable, i.e. a ￿hard peg￿ or ￿super fix￿. This might be done by 
maintaining one￿s national currency but creating a rigid commitment to permanently 
fixed or ￿hard￿ rates through institutional arrangements such as a Currency Board 
Arrangement (CBA), or by effectively abandoning the domestic currency altogether 
by using domestically the currency of another country (dollarization or eurorization). 
The political unpalatability of dollarization or euroization along with its significant 
policy constrictions - which inflict a CBA as well (see Rajan, 2002a and 2003b and 
Eichengreen, 2001a) - seems effectively to leave only a common regional currency as 
a practicable alternative. But is it?  
Eichengreen (1994, pp.4-7) appears to think so. He has predicted that, in the 
future, capital mobility will leave countries with one of two choices -- a super fix 
involving monetary union or the other extreme of floating. Von Furstenberg (2000, 
pp.199-200) argues more specifically that monetary unions are ￿inevitable..the wave 
of the future￿.  
Having experienced the turbulence of the regional crisis against the backdrop 
of the successful introduction of a single European currency, leaders of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to study the feasibility of a 
common ASEAN currency system
1. There has been much popular discussion in the 
region about the economic and political possibility and desirability of forming a larger 
Asian Monetary Union (AMU) akin to the European Monetary Union (EMU)
2. From 
an economic standpoint, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999a,b) have concluded that 
East Asia may be as close to - or rather, as far away from - being an optimum 
                                                 
1 Announced as part of the latest ASEAN summit meeting in Hanoi and included in the ￿Hanoi Plan of 
Action￿ (Business Times, Singapore, 15 December, 1998). 
2 See for instance, the Straits Times, Singapore (11 January, 1999 and 4 October, 1998) and Curtis 
(1998).  7
currency area (OCA) as Western Europe
3. This conclusion is based on an OCA index 
that takes into account the costs associated with asymmetric region-wide shocks as 
well as the benefits from stabilizing exchange rates with trading partners
4. More 
informally, but in similar vein, the IMF￿s Managing Director, Horst Kohler (2001), 
has noted: 
trading patterns and geography do make it reasonable to think of the 
creation of an internal market in Asia as a possible, future stage in 
regional cooperation. And why should this not be a basis for greater 
monetary integration￿? (p.4) 
 
There are at least two important differences between ASEAN/East Asia and 
Western Europe. First, any form of regional monetary union requires that there be 
compensating fiscal transfers from the richer to less well off states in the absence of 
sufficiently frictionless intraregional labor mobility. In the case of Europe, the extent 
of such transfers is quite significant in per capita terms of the poorer states, but fairly 
low in absolute terms as the richer states in Europe are much larger than the poorer 
ones (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1999a,b). This is in contrast to ASEAN where the 
poorer regional members also happen to be the largest ones (Indonesia versus 
Singapore).  
Second, the European experience has emphasized the need for strong political 
will and consensus towards such a policy goal. - Indeed, some like Goodhart (1995) 
dispute the relevance of economic criteria altogether, claiming that political 
consideration dominate formation of currency areas. -  Such a political consensus, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
3 Similarly, Rockoff (2000) has stressed that the US could be said to have been an OCA only around 
the 1930s. See Kenen (2000) for a recent discussion of the OCA theory.  8
while gradually emerging in Southeast and the larger East Asian regions, is still far 
off from being universal. To be sure, ￿vision statements￿ by regional leaders for a 
currency union, while having become more common since the crisis, has hitherto not 
been backed up by any serious discussion on the type of institutional structures or 
formal mechanisms and decision-making bodies needed for such regional economic 
integration of monetary and exchange rate policies to be a success (such as an 
independent region-wide central bank, a system of inter-regional fiscal transfers, 
measures to ensure European-type macroeconomic convergence, and the like). 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999b) have noted:   
there is little sign, comparable to the evidence which has existed in 
Europe for nearly 50 years, of a willingness to subordinate national 
prerogatives to some larger regional entity, There is no wider web of 
interlocking arrangements, as in the EU, which would be put at risk by 




Thus, Kenen￿s (2000) general conclusion that solving the problems of 
governance and accountability needed to form a currency union may be far too 
herculean a task for most other groups of countries outside Europe, appears especially 
pertinent to Southeast Asia and the larger East Asian region in the foreseeable future. 
The infeasibility of a monetary union for East Asia in the near future, as well 
as the limitations of other forms of super fixes, appears to leave a flexible regime as 
                                                                                                                                            
4 In any case, it is possible that OCA criteria may be at least partly endogenous, suggesting that some 
unions may be more justifiable ex post rather than ex ante (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
5 In addition, substantial asymmetries in the sizes and levels and stages of economic development of 
the countries in East Asia, on the one hand, and the de facto policy of strict non-intervention in one 
another￿s affairs (economic and particularly political), on the other, makes it extremely difficult to 
envisage the successful introduction of ￿tie-in￿ clauses to create punishment mechanisms to ensure 
conformity of economic policies as done in Europe.  9
the only viable policy option. Section 2 deliberates on the case for and against a 
flexible regime. To anticipate the main conclusion of the Section - while favoring 
relatively more flexible regimes, emerging economies in East Asia and elsewhere 
have continued to heavily manage their currencies despite being officially described 
as ￿floaters￿. In view of this, Section 3 revisits the corners hypothesis and offers an 
alternative policy perspective. Section 4 explores the case for and operational 
mechanics behind an open inflation targeting regime which has increasingly been 
advocated for small and open economies in East Asia and elsewhere. This section 
stresses the importance of incorporating the exchange rate in open economy monetary 
policy rules. The post-crisis East Asian monetary policy arrangements provide a 
suitable context for analyzing what part the exchange rate might play in the 
construction of an inflation targeting regime and there is evidence suggesting that East 
Asian monetary authorities have been attempting to manage the variability of the 
currency movements. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Flexible Exchange Rate Option Reconsidered 
2.1  Reasons to Favor Flexibility  
A priori, there are a number of reasons that underlie a preference for a greater 
degree of exchange rate flexibility.  
First, the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the keener the incentives for 
agents to undertake appropriate foreign exchange (forex) risk management techniques 
in response to the higher element of exchange rate risk, while simultaneously 
reducing the extent of moral hazard which could lead to ￿excessive￿ unhedged 
external borrowing (referred to as a  ￿fixed exchange rate bubble￿). The introduction 
of these transaction costs and exchange rate risks may also help moderate the extent  10
of capital inflows, consequently dampening the intensity of boom and bust cycles 
(this is essentially a moral hazard argument). 
Second, small and open economies are far more susceptible to large external 
shocks, such as changes in foreign interest rates, terms of trade, regional contagion 
effects and the like. Received theory tells us that a greater degree of exchange rate 
flexibility is called for in the presence of external or domestic real shocks. By acting 
as a safety valve, flexible exchange regimes provide a less costly adjustment 
mechanism by which relative prices can be altered in response to such shocks as 
opposed to fixed rate regimes. The latter relies on gradual reductions in relative costs 
through deflation and productivity increases vis-￿-vis trade partners to restore internal 
balance. This can prove to be prolonged and costly, as the Argentine example 
illustrates (Rajan. 2002c)
6. Hong Kong, the other notable example of an operating 
CBA, has been faced with similar albeit less intense deflationary pressures since 1998 
with ever more frequent calls for it to forsake its US dollar peg (Liu, 2002 and Rajan 
and Siregar, 2002)
7.  
Third, many small economies have diversified trade structures (dependent on 
the US, Japan, Europe and intra-Asian trade). Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria 
suggest that such economies are good candidates to operate more flexible regimes. 
Thus, in the case of East Asia, institutionalization of the pre-crisis dollar pegs (via a 
CBA or dollarization) would not have helped domestic economic performance in 
1996-97 (just prior to the crisis) to the extent that the problem was, at least partly, one 
                                                 
6 Three points should be noted here. One, empirical evidence suggests that pass through of devaluation 
is partial; indeed, inflationary predictions were dire in many economies following the financial crises in 
the 1990s but did not materialize. Two, devaluation can have real effects in the short term during non-
crisis periods. Devaluation during crisis periods appears to be contractionary rather than expansionary 
(Hausmann et al., 2000 and Rajan and Shen, 2001). Three, repeated devaluations will only have price 
effects without any real effects as they come to be anticipated by the private sector. 
7 The Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Tony Latter (2002), offers a 
stout defense of the Hong Kong US dollar peg. 
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of loss of competitiveness due to fluctuations in the US dollar and yen cross-rate (Bird 
and Rajan, 2002). Consistent with this, a recent study of exports by about 100 
emerging economies to the US, Japan and Europe over the period 1983-92 concludes 
that the more flexible the exchange rate regime the better the export performance 
(Nilsson and Nilsson, 2000). However, countries pegging to a composite group of 
currencies do not appear to have experienced weaker economic performance than 
ones with independently floating regimes
8.  
Fourth, it is often suggested that a rigid basket peg may operate as a nominal 
anchor for monetary policy and be a way of introducing some degree of financial 
discipline domestically and breaking inflationary inertia. Thus, a multicountry study 
of 136 countries over the period 1960-89 conducted by Ghosh et al. (1995) found that 
inflation rates generally tend to be greater and more volatile under more flexible 
regimes, though economic growth is less volatile. An IMF (1997) study of 123 
emerging economies covering the period 1975-96 arrives at a broadly similar 
conclusion, viz. the median inflation rate of ￿peggers￿ has been consistently lower 
and less volatile than those with more flexible arrangements, though the inflation 
differential between the two sets of countries has decreased through the 1990s. 
While these studies are instructive, they are by no means conclusive, as they 
do not account for the possibility of endogeneity of the choice of exchange rate 
regimes. Specifically, we cannot be sure as to whether a fixed exchange rate actually 
leads to lower inflation or whether countries which experience low inflation rates 
adopt such a regime. 
Glick et al. (1999) have argued that policies of pegging exchange rates in East 
Asia were of little benefit in terms of acting as a counter-inflationary device, this goal 
                                                 
8 Their data is based on official IMF classification of exchange rate arrangements, i.e. they use de jure  12
having been attained primarily due to other factors such as relative autonomy of the 
monetary authorities. In their view, the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors may 
have actually acted as a liability as it prevented the necessary nominal currency 
adjustments in response to external shocks from taking place. In addition, both theory 
and lessons of experience with nominal anchors have shown that such pegging loses 
credibility over time and induces booms followed by inevitable busts and crises 
episodes. Pegging the exchange rate also constrains monetary independence; if 
unrestrained monetary policy has been a facet of the country￿s past, imposing 
exchange rate fixity may be an advantage as it constrains the active use of monetary 
policy. If, however, monetary and fiscal policies have proved effective in the past, 
governments may be reluctant to constrain their ability to use them in the future by 
targeting a particular exchange rate
9.  
Fifth, there is a widespread belief that a pegged regime induces increased 
policy discipline as fiscal profligacy will lead to a reserve depletion or burgeoning 
debt and an eventual currency collapse. However, the effects of unsound macro 
policies become evident immediately under flexible rates through currency and price 
level movements (i.e. depreciation-inflation spiral). Thus, flexible rates ought to instill 
greater fiscal restraint, as the costs of macroeconomic policy transgressions have to be 
paid upfront. In other words, the key distinction between fixed and floating rates is in 
the intertemporal distribution of costs and benefits (Tornell and Velasco, 2000). 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) have provided some empirical validity of this argument. 
After controlling for a host of other factors, they find that Latin American fiscal 
                                                                                                                                            
rather than de facto exchange rate regime. 
9 However, recent empirical evidence casts doubt on the extent to which floating regimes in emerging 
economies provide insulation from foreign interest rate shocks (see Frankel et al., 2000a and Hausmann 
et al., 2000). 
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policies were more prudent under flexible rates than under floating ones. 
 
2.2  Reasons for a “Fear of Floating” 
In view of the anticipated benefits of flexible regimes, many observers have 
enthusiastically advocated the flexible options.  
Despite the preceding reasons favoring a flexible exchange rate regime, 
countries with flexible regimes have experienced ￿excessive￿ volatility over the last 
few decades
10. It is admittedly difficult to define what exactly is meant by the term 
￿excessive￿. However, a reading of the relevant empirical literature reveals that 
evidence of excessive exchange rate variability comes in a number of forms (Bird and 
Rajan, 2001). For instance, a number of surveys of foreign exchange (forex) market 
participants clearly indicate that short term/high frequency exchange rate movements 
are caused by ￿speculative￿ or ￿trend-following￿ elements rather than underlying 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The problem of destabilizing speculation (as opposed 
to the Friedmanite speculators) - and consequent excessive or self-aggravating 
exchange rate volatility - and dominance of fads and bubbles appears to have been 
aggravated in emerging economies, making a flexible regime especially 
unviable/unsuitable to them. This is particularly so since thin markets - which exist in 
emerging economies - imply that a few transactions can lead to extreme currency 
fluctuations.  
Even if it were accepted that flexible exchange rates often appear to exhibit 
greater volatility in high frequency data than would be warranted by the underlying 
fundamentals, why might such excessive volatility be of concern? Recent studies have 
provided evidence of a negative impact of currency volatility/uncertainty on  14
investment (Corbo and Cox, 1995 and Huizinga, 1994). To the extent that investment 
has a significant positive impact on economic growth, declining investment will have 
an enduring adverse impact on the quantity of real resources. Even in the absence of a 
negative effect on the level of investment, currency variability may have an adverse 
influence over the composition of investment since decisions could be based on 
disequilibrium prices. In an important study, BØnassy-QuØrØ (1999) show that 
exchange rate volatility could have a detrimental impact on FDI, comparable to the 
distortions created by currency misalignments.  
It has often been argued that firms and other agents involved in international 
transactions can buy cover to hedge themselves against currency movements. 
However, in addition to the costs involved with such operations, perfect hedges may 
be very difficult to create technically (given acute revenue-cost uncertainties) (Adler, 
1994). Indeed, even if effective hedges could be created, they would entail non-
negligible transaction costs, thus diverting scarce resources from ￿real￿ economic 
activity. This is especially true in the case of emerging economies where
 rudimentary 
capital markets have necessitated using cross-hedging techniques (rather than direct 
hedging), which invariably are far costlier. 
Wei (1999) provides some important empirical evidence which suggests that 
exchange rate volatility has had a detrimental effect on trade between pairs of countries 
to a much larger extent than suggested by previous studies. More generally, in a 
comprehensive survey of the literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade 
flows, McKenzie (1999) concludes that the recent empirical studies have had ￿greater 
success in deriving a statistically significant relationship between volatility and trade￿ 
(p.100). Calvo and Reinhart (2000) review a more limited set of such studies and draw 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Of course, almost no country has maintained a completely free (or pure) float, the authorities  15
a similar conclusion. Another recent set of empirics by Andrew Rose based on gravity 
models using both cross-sectional and time series data suggests institutionally fixed 
exchange regimes (i.e. common currency, currency boards or dollarization) stimulates 
trade, which in turn boosts income (see Frankel and Rose, 2002, Glick and Rose, 2002 
and Rose, 2000). As is common knowledge, proponents of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) have used such an argument extensively in support of a single regional 
currency.  
Flexible exchange rates may also be associated with currency misalignments, 
with accompanying costs in terms of resource misallocation and detrimental effects 
on economic growth. Cooper (1999) nicely summarizes the preceding discussion as 
follows: 
The core problem is that for economies with imperfectly developed 
financial markets the exchange rate is the most important asset price, 
and it will be jerked around by changes in portfolio sentiments. But for 
an open economy the exchange rate is also the most important price in 
the market for goods and services. Jumping asset prices can badly 
disrupt the markets on which the economic well-being of the majority 
of residents depends￿.(I)t is an open question whether a broad, 
diversified financial market based on the domestic currency can 
develop under floating exchange rates￿The unwelcome conclusion 
that flows from this discussion is that free movements of capital and 
floating exchange rates are basically incompatible, except for large and 
diversified economies with well-developed and sophisticated financial 
markets (pp.111-2). 
 
Notwithstanding the recent weakness of the Australian dollar, its successful 
experience with a floating arrangement, particularly in terms of withstanding the East 
Asian crisis, has often been cited as evidence of the ￿superiority￿ of such a regime, and 
has been prescribed as a panacea for other emerging economies. However, such an 
advocacy does not pay due consideration to the fact that there are important structural 
differences between industrial countries such as Australia, on the one hand, and 
                                                                                                                                            
ntervening intermittently to smooth market fluctuations. In other words ￿dirty floats￿ - i.e. forex  16
emerging economies, on the other. For instance, industrial countries have well-
developed and diversified financial systems that are able to minimize real sector 
disruptions due to transitory exchange rate variations (abstracting from the resource 
allocation costs of misalignments noted previously). Most importantly, industrial 
countries are able to borrow overseas in their domestic currencies. Many emerging 
economies are unable to do so, leading to an accumulation of foreign currency debt 
liabilities that are primarily dollar denominated and unhedged (i.e. ￿liability 
dollarization￿)
11. In such countries, sharp depreciations in their currencies alter the 
domestic currency value of their external debt and therefore the net worth of the 
economies, with calamitous real sector effects (so-called ￿balance sheet￿ effects). This 
in turn may be an explanation for the continued priority given to a relatively high 
degree of exchange rate stability in emerging economies. In other words, many 
emerging economies are plagued by an acute ￿fear of floating￿ (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002).  
 
3.      The Impossible Trilogy Revisited 
The ￿hollowing of the middle￿ hypothesis seems to draw analytical support 
from the ￿Impossible Trilogy￿
12. Simply put, this states that a country cannot 
simultaneously conduct independent monetary policy and pursue a fixed exchange 
regime if it wants to remain completely open to international capital flows (Figure 1 
again). From an analytical perspective, Frankel (1999) has provided us with the timely 
reminder that the Impossible Trilogy does not on its own imply that in an increasingly 
globalized world economy an intermediate regime is unviable or that countries will be 
                                                                                                                                            
interventions without commitment to defend any specific parity - have been the norm.  
11 This is commonly referred to as the ￿original sin￿ hypothesis, a term attributed to Hausmann (1999) 
and Hausmann et al. (2000). 
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compelled to abandon the middle ground. In fact, there is a growing body of opinion 
that recognizes the potential usefulness of restraints on financial flows as a financial 
safeguard (Rajan, 2003a); there is no longer an ideological belief in the benefits of a 
completely open capital account
13. Once this is accepted, the analytical basis in 
support of the corners hypothesis weakens substantially; neither corner appears to 
work all that well for emerging economies.  
Indeed, the prevailing sentiment in favor of the bipolar or binary view of 
exchange rates is not without its doubters. For instance, Bergsten et al. (1999) has 
made the important point that ￿(m)anaged floats do not have the clean, clear-cut allure 
of full institutional purity, but, in a world of second-bests, they are worth exploring￿ 
(p.9). Stanley Fischer (2001) has acknowledged that there are many instances where 
intermediate regimes might well be ￿more appropriate￿ than corner solutions
14. 
Willett (2002) too strongly questions whether countries really face such stark 
choices in their choice of exchange regimes. As he notes: 
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) yields a well-
established list of..criteria that affect the costs and benefits of adopting 
fixed versus flexible exchange artes. The application of a sensible 
range of parameter values to these criteria suggests that 
many￿countries are not good candidates for either genuinely fixed 
exchange rates where domestic monetary policy is fully determined by 
developments in the balance of payments or for completely flexible 
exchange rates where no weight is given to the exchange rate 
developments in setting domestic policy￿(I)t is not limited exchange 
rate flexibility per se that gives rise to currency crises, but the 
inconsistency between exchange rate and monetary policy that so often 
emerges under intermediate exchange rate regimes￿ (pp.3 and 6). 
 
The preceding leads to the rather unsatisfying conclusion that when it comes 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Also referred to as ￿Impossible Trinity￿. 
13 While empirical evidence regarding the benefits from capital account liberalization is unclear, risks 
of premature of ill-timed liberalization are unequivocal (Arteta et al., 2001 and Rajan, 2002b). 
14 In fact, Fischer (2001) has noted that the bipolar view of exchange rates ought to be presented as a 
choice between a hard peg versus a ￿more flexible regime￿ rather than a flexible exchange rate regime 
per se. The latter option implies the absence of any explicit exchange rate target, i.e. intervention 
should not be framed primarily in terms of defending a particular exchange rate target.   18
to the choice of appropriate exchange rate regime, all that can really be said is that 
there exists a broad spectrum of choices. It is not a black-or-white issue; shades of 
grey abound. The choice of exchange rate regime cannot be done in isolation. It must 
be seen as part of a coherent macroeconomic strategy. No exchange rate regime will 
deliver stability if domestic macroeconomic policy is unsound, with large fiscal 
deficits, rapid monetary growth and inflation. Pegged exchange rates will become 
overvalued and reserves will fall, while flexible exchange rates will depreciate and 
may result in crises just as much as pegged regimes. Exchange rate policy in 
emerging economies may need to have a more limited objective. Rather than focusing 
on disciplining domestic macroeconomic policy and labor markets, perhaps the 
exchange rate regime should be designed in the first instance to minimize exposure to 
the third currency phenomenon, where the problem for emerging economies arises 
from fluctuations in the values of the currencies of their major trading partners against 
one another.  
In the absence of strong capital controls, currency intervention ought not be 
framed as a specific target for the exchange rate. Such targets inevitably tempt 
speculators by offering them the infamous one-way option. Thus, exchange rate and 
monetary policy strategies must involve a ￿fairly high￿ element of flexibility rather 
than a single-minded defense of a particular rate. This might best be achieved by a 
variant on sliding parities and wider bands around an appropriately weighted currency 
basket, the extent of which varying across the countries depending on individual 
circumstances and policy preferences (a so-termed band-basket-or-crawl or BBC)
15 or 
a flexible inflation target. The latter involves gradual adjustment to an inflation target 
along with a positive weight on the exchange rate (in addition to inflation and output). 
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While the topic of currency basket arrangements for East Asia have been extensively 
explored elsewhere (for instance, see Bird and Rajan, 2002, Rajan, 2000a, Rajan, 
2003b and references cited within), the remainder of this paper explores key aspects 
of open inflation targeting in general and particularly as they relate to East Asia. 
 
4.  Open Economy Inflation Targeting: Role of the Exchange Rate  
 
4.1  Monetary Policy Rules in Open Economies 
 
  Buoyed by the apparent success of inflation targeting in industrial countries in 
the early 1990s, it has been strongly advocated by the IMF and other as a viable 
policy option for emerging economies in East Asian and elsewhere. What exactly is 
inflation targeting? While definitions vary in the literature, Eichengreen (2001b) 
defines inflation targeting as follows: 
(A) monetary policy operating strategy with four elements: an 
institutionalized commitment to price stability as the primary goal of 
monetary policy; mechanisms rendering the central bank accountable 
for attaining its monetary policy goals; the public announcement of 
targets for inflation; and a policy of communicating to the public and 
the markets the rationale for the decisions taken by the central bank 
(p.4). 
 
      For the most part, inflation targeting is conducted in conjunction with a 
monetary policy rule (MPR). In general terms, a MPR is one element of a strategy 
employed by the monetary authority as part of its overall monetary policy. More 
specifically, the MPR should specify how the instrument of monetary policy is to be 
changed given the characteristics of the macroeconomy and the policy objectives of 
the monetary authority. The instrument of monetary policy is most commonly an 
interest rate, usually a short-term cash rate or repo rate. However, other policy 
instruments could also be used
16.  
                                                                                                                                            
15 The crawl is meant to compensate for inflation differentials. Williamson (1999b, 2001) discusses the 
BBC policy in some detail. 
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In an IT regime, MPRs implicitly assume that the instrument of monetary 
policy will always react strongly to inflation (or some forecast of future inflation). It 
is important to stress the differences between MPRs and inflation targeting. The two 
are different elements of a general monetary policy strategy. The MPR provides a 
guide to the policymaker for how to manipulate the instrument of monetary policy; 
the inflation target simply makes a statement of what the instrument is being 
ultimately used for. According to Taylor (2000b): 
There is an interesting symbiotic relationship between inflation 
targeting and monetary policy rules..A monetary policy rule is nothing 
more than a contingency plan that describes as precisely as possible the 




For much of this last decade, the literature on MPRs has developed in a closed 
economy context (Ball, 1997 and Svensson, 1997). It is only recently, when inflation 
targeting has been suggested as a serious policy option for small and open emerging 
economies that research has begun to focus on rules in open economy models and, 
consequently, the role of the exchange rate. For instance, Fischer (2001) notes that ￿in 
most countries, even those with floating exchange rate regimes, monetary policy is 
likely to respond to some extent to movements in the exchange rate￿ (p.13).  
 
a) Stylized  Macro  Model   
                                                                                                                                            
16 For instance, McCallum (1999) has suggested the use of the growth rate of a money. As will be 
discussed later, in some cases, a weighted average for the interest rate and exchange rate (so-called 
Monetary Conditions Index) might be used.  
17 Closely related to the distinction between MPRs and IT is the need to distinguish between two types 
of policy rules, viz. an instrument rule and a target rule (Svensson, 1997, 2000). The former is a rule for 
the monetary policy instrument that is imposed into a model but has no explicit reference to a policy 
target or objective. The latter is one that is derived as an endogenous optimal function from a model 
that has been solved explicitly for a particular target or a monetary authority welfare function. A target 
rule focuses policymaker￿s attention on the stated target and is very model-dependent. The instrument 
rule need not be directly related a specific objective and offers the flexibility to be applied across 
models (Batini and Haldane 1999). There are many examples of instrument rules - the most widely 
cited being the Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993).  21
In order to examine how the exchange rate enters an MPR, let us consider a 
stylized dynamic model of a small open economy which can be represented with a 
usual output function or an open economy IS curve (eq. 1), an open economy, 
accerleationist Phillips curve equation (eq. 2), and an uncovered interest parity 
condition (in general form) with the expected depreciation of the exchange rate 
normalized to zero (eq. 3): 
 
yt = f [rt-1, yt-1, et-1, εεεε t]         ( 1 )  
 
ππππ t = g [ππππ t-1, yt-1, et-1, ηηηη t]       ( 2 )
18 
 
et = h [rt, r
*




t and rpt is the foreign interest rate and a risk premium, respectively,  ∆ refers 
to changes and f (.), g (.) and h (.) and general functional forms ￿ although they 
appear as linear in almost all models presented in this literature. Assume ε t and η t are 
random shocks not known to the policy maker. Eqs. 1 to 3 above are written in 
general functional forms but could just as easily be written in linear terms as they 
usually are.  
  Thus, a key result of the model is that monetary policy affects inflation 
directly through the price effects of currency movements, as well as indirectly via 
output (which in turn is impacted by both interest and exchange rate changes). The 
direct effect takes place contemporaneously, while the lag structure of the stylized 
economy implies that indirect effects on inflation via output occur after two periods. 
The more open the economy the stronger the effects of import prices on domestic 
inflation, i.e. a larger coefficient on the et-1 in eq.2 and an increased effect of the 
exchange rate on goods demand in eq.3. 
                                                 
18 Eq. 4 is sometimes specified as:  π t = g [π t-1, yt-1, (et-1- et-2), η t].  22
 
b)  Interest Rate Rule 
Assuming the existence of a quadratic loss function, it can be shown that 
optimal monetary policy rule is give by a sort of Taylor Rule (a la Taylor, 1993, 
2000a,b):  
 
rt = ayt + bππππ t + c1et + c2et-1       ( 4 )  
 
where  et and et-1 refer to the foreign currency price of domestic currency in time 
period t and t-1, respectively; π t is the inflation rate; yt is real GDP in time t; and rt is 
the real interest rate at time t. π t is expressed as deviation from the policy target while 
the other variables are expressed as deviations from their respective steady 
state/equilibrium mean values
19.  
  The relevant question is what value should the c parameters take. The original 
Taylor rule for a large, relatively closed economy like the US is one where a,b >0 and 
c1 =c2 =0. For a small, open economy, it is generally agreed that the exchange rate 
should enter the MPR with a non-zero coefficient. In particular, c1 must be less than 
zero and c2 must be greater than or equal to zero. This is so as an appreciation 
(increase) of the domestic currency necessitates a relaxation of monetary policy, i.e. 
currency appreciation tends to be deflationary. A positive c2 represents a partial 
adjustment of the instrument to currency movements. Recent work using model 
simulations find values for c1 range between ￿0.45 and ￿0.25, while those for c2 range 
between 0.15 and 0.45 (Taylor, 2000a).  
                                                 
19 The MPR is sometimes modified to include an interest rate smoothing process which describes the 
gradual adjustment of the interest rate to its target by the monetary authority. Also see fn 22. 
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In summary, inflation targeting in an open economy implies that the monetary 
authority stabilizes the exchange rate as a means to reduce inflation volatility and not as 
a goal in itself
20. There have been some recent contributions examining the effect of the 
exchange rate on interest rate rules. Clarida et al. (1998) estimated a set of MPRs for 
two sets of countries. The first set is Germany, Japan and the US while the UK, France 
and Italy form the second set. The latter set constitutes relatively smaller and more open 
economies. It turns out that the policy rules for the second set reacted significantly more 
strongly to the exchange rate (in this case, the DM) and to German monetary policy 
than did the first set. This is an indication that more open economies may feel the need 
to smooth the volatility of their exchange rates. There have been few studies to date that 
have looked at policy rules for East Asian countries. This is an important area for future 
research. 
 
c)  Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) 
Another way in which the exchange rate might be included in a rule is via a 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  (Ball, 1999 and Svensson, 2000). The MCI takes 
the following form: 
  
wrt + (1-w)et = ayt + bππππ t       ( 5 )  
 
In other words, the MCI is merely a weighted combination of movements in the 
interest rate and the exchange rate.  
                                                 
20 There is an outstanding issue of what type of exchange rate to use. Strictly speaking, eq. 1 requires 
the inclusion of export-weighted real exchange rate while eq. 2 requires the use of import weighted 
nominal exchange rates. This apart, an alternative to an inflation target would be a price target, i.e. 
specifying the price level, as opposed to the inflation rate.  24
The central idea behind a MCI is that the ratio between the exchange rate and 
the interest rate remains constant. This ensures, for example, that tight monetary 
policy is reflected in both the money and foreign exchange markets. This is done 
either by manipulating both of the instruments separately or by changing one 
instrument - usually the interest rate - which in turn will induce changes in the other. 
Ball (1999), for instance, suggests that the underlying instrument of the MCI is the 
interest rate. As such, the constant ratio between the interest rate and the exchange 
rate is maintained by shifting the interest rate which will then affect a change in the 
exchange rate. For this to work effectively, there must exist a stable relationship 
between the two policy instruments
21. This in turn requires the satisfaction of 
arbitrage price conditions (such as the UIP ￿ eq. 3 above).   
Thus, speaking about Thailand which has an MCI target, Hataiseree (1998) 
notes: 
The MCI can be used to compare the degree of importance between 
interest rate and the exchange rate in influencing the future inflation 
rate. Empirically, it was found that the MCI ratio for Thailand takes the 
value of 3.3 : 1. This ratio implies that when the baht is expected to 
depreciate at an average rate of 3.3% in any particular time, ceteris 
paribus, the interest rate needs to be raised by an average of 1% in 
order to prevent the expectation of the bath depreciation from effecting 
the forecasting of the future inflation rate. 
 
While an important virtue of the MCI is its transparency and verifiability a la 
Frankel et al. (2000b), a major drawback with its use as an operational target is that it 
straitjackets monetary policy in some instances to the detriment of output and 
employment (Cavoli and Rajan, 2003). Considerable care therefore needs to be taken 
in the implementation of the MCI as an operational target. There is a growing 
consensus that, at best, the MCI offers a useful composite indicator of overall 
                                                 
21 A second criterion for the working of an MCI is the absence of sterilization of the monetary effects 
of policy as this will undo the working of the MCI. 
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financial conditions in a small and open economy (HKMA, 2000 and Hataiseree, 
1998).  
 
4.2  Exploring the Loss Function of the Monetary Authority in an Open 
Economy 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on the use of the exchange rate as part of the 
instrument rule or in some cases as the instrument itself. But what happens if the 
monetary authority is also concerned about exchange rate volatility as a policy objective 
in and of itself? ￿Fear of floating￿ implies that a monetary authority uses monetary 
policy to react to exchange rate movements for its own sake. As noted, this may arise 
because of the concerns about the impact of ￿excessive volatility￿ on the exchange rate 
on trade, investment and growth.  
Of course, strictly speaking, if the desire for exchange rate stability stems from 
its potential deleterious effects on growth, arguably this implies that eq. 1 above is mis-
specified, with an additional term for exchange rate variability needing to be added on 
to the right hand side of eq. 1. If this is done, there ought not to be any reason to be 
concerned about exchange rate stability for its own sake (i.e. there is no reason that it 
should enter the monetary authority￿s loss function independently over and above 
inflation and output). Thus, for the exchange rate to directly enter the monetary 
authority￿s loss function it must either: (a) be valued for its own sake over and above its 
impact on inflation and output; or (b) if valued because of its impact on inflation and 
output, for some reason, cannot be adequately captured in the specified macro model 
(eqs. 1 and 2).  
Consider a generalized, multi-period loss function of the monetary authority: 
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where δ  is a discount factor representing the central bank￿s rate of time preference, α , 
λ , ν , ￿, κ  are policy weights for inflation, output, interest rate smoothing, nominal 
income and the exchange rate respectively and the objectives of the monetary 
authority are principally inflation and output and also include interest rate 
smoothing
22.    
On the basis of eq. 6 above, we can identify a number of possible targeting 
scenarios. These are summarized in Table 2
23. 
Assume the simplest case where all coefficients in eq. 5 are set to zero other 
than  α .  This implies that the specified monetary authority focuses solely on the 
inflation objective (ignoring the interest smoothing objective)
24. However, even with 
strict inflation targeting there is still a positive coefficient on the output gap in the 
MPR (eq. 4) in view of the importance of the output gap in impacting future inflation. 
The inclusion of the output variable effectively implies that the monetary authority 
pursues a ￿soft￿ or ￿flexible￿ inflation target, whereby the aim is not to hit the target 
inflation as soon as possible, but rather, do so over time ￿ therefore avoiding the 
possibility of inducing greater output volatility (Debelle, 2001 and Mishkin, 2002). 
We elaborate on this point in Section 5. 
If the exchange rate policy parameter (Κ) is positive, this represents an attempt 
by the monetary authority to manage the movements in its exchange rate (as well as 
                                                 
22 We include the interest smoothing term in the loss function as in practice central banks tend 
are keen on prevent sharp fluctuations in the instrument (also fn 19). Indeed, the same argument would 
probably hold in the case of the inclusion of the exchange rate, especially if the instrument is the MCI. 
Nonetheless, in the literature (as well as policy), while the exchange rate issue is viewed as being 
controversial, the interest smoothing one is not. It bears noting that even those who strongly advocate 
that the inflation targeting monetary authority should react to asset prices in the course of policy 
making, are clear that asset prices ought not to be included in the objective function. See Cecchetti et 
al. (2002) for a clear statement on this. 
 
23 Also see Debelle (2001) and Leitemo et al. (2002). 
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output). When the loss function is minimized subject to a macro model as the 
constraints (eqs. 1 - 3), the resulting monetary policy rule (eq. 4) will include an 
exchange rate policy parameter in the same way as α  is for inflation or λ  is for output. 
However, even if the exchange rate is not in the loss function, the exchange rate will 
enter the MPR with a positive coefficient in view of its information content about 
current and future inflation (and output).  
But can a monetary authority use monetary policy rules with some form of 
inflation stabilization objective to also manage movements in its currency? As 
discussed in Section 3, moving away from the corners would imply that if there is 
some scope for managing currency movements to some extent there is also some 
latitude for autonomous monetary policy in the form of MPRs (also see Debelle, 
2001).  
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
Since the East Asian financial debacle of 1997-98, a handful of countries in 
the region -- Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines -- have instituted 
monetary policy arrangements fashioned around an inflation objective. Each of these 
countries has passed legal and institutional legislations supporting their respective IT 
arrangements
25. These legislations so passed provide for many facets of the new 
monetary policy regime including the appointment of key personnel and their tenure 
(five year terms in Korea and four years each in Indonesia and Thailand
), the 
independence and autonomy of the monetary authority, the stated objectives of 
monetary policy and the responsibilities and accountability with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Mervyn King (1996) terms such a monetary authority an ￿inflation nutter￿. 
25 The revised Bank of Korea Act in December 1997 (and revised in April 1998), the new bank of 
Indonesia Act in May 1999 and the Bank of Thailand Act of May 2000, respectively.  28
achievement of those objectives. For example, Article 3 of the Bank of Korea Act 
states that ￿monetary and credit policies of the Bank of Korea shall be formulated 
neutrally and implemented autonomously and [it￿s] independence ￿shall be 
respected￿.  Article  6  provides  for  the  annual  setting  of  the  price  stability  target             
( www.bok.or.kr
  ).  
How have these new inflation targeters performed since implementing an IT 
system? The inflation performances of these new regimes against their stated targets 
are provided in Table 3
26. Thus far the performances have been reasonably good, with 
Thailand, Korea and the Philippines for the most part being within target. Indonesia 
has struggled to keep its inflation within its target range while Korea also exceeded its 
target for 2001 and 2002. In contrast to the de jure exchange rate classifications, 
observations of the de facto regimes ￿ the exchange rate arrangements that countries 
are actually implementing ￿ seem to reveal to suggest a reversion to US dollar pegs, 
albeit ones not as tightly as before the crisis (Figure 2). Several studies have shown 
this to be the case (for instance, see Baig, 2001, Calvo and Reinhart, 2002 and 
McKinnon, 2000).  
Is the relative fixity of regional currencies really a reversion to ad hoc 
managed floating regimes as many have argued, or is it a consequence of ￿flexible￿ or 
￿soft￿ inflation. This is an area requiring more detailed examination in the future.  
                                                 
 
26 It is worth noting that each of these monetary authorities defines inflation a little differently to each 
other. Indonesia excludes the effect of government prices and incomes policy. Korea uses CPI 
excluding petrol and some farm products.  Thailand excludes raw food and energy prices. See 
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Exchange Rate Regimes Ranged along the Continuum from 









•  Free Floating 
 





The absence of regular/systematic intervention in the forex market 
 




•  Target zone/band 
 
•  Crawling peg 
 









A margin of fluctuation around some central rate 
 
A pre-announced policy of devaluing ￿a bit￿ each week 
 
Fixing the exchange rate, but without any open-ended commitment to resist 
devaluation or revaluation in the presence of a large balance of payments 
deficit or surplus 
 



















Commitment to undertake whatever forex market intervention needed to 
maintain prevailing rate, but not necessarily any institutional commitment to 
back the regime 
 
Three defining characteristics: fixing not just by policy but by law; backing 
increases in the monetary base one-for-one with forex reserves; and allowing 
balance of payments deficits to tighten monetary policy consequently adjusting 
spending automatically 
 
The adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender. Includes the special case of 
official dollarization  
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  Table 3    
Actual versus Targeted Inflation Rates (in percent): 
Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines 
 
  1999 
 
 
2000 2001 2002  2003 
  Target 
 
Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target 
Korea 
 
3.0 0.8 2.5 1.8 2.5 3.2 2.5 3.7 2.5 
Indonesia 
 
    3-5  5.9  3-5 12.5 3-5 10.3 9.0 
Thailand 
 
    <3.5 0.7 <3.5 1.2 <3.5 1.6 <3.5 
Philippines 
 





   * plus/minus half percentage point 
Sources: McCauley (2001), Bank of Korea, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Thailand, Bangko Sentral ng Phillipines 42
 
 
Source: Author based on Frankel (1999) file:///U:/exchangerateusperlc_index_ALL_M.jpg
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